Envy

Last week I presented a trilogy of analyses, —The Silent Retreat of AI in the Dominican Republic, The Retreat No One Wants to See, and The Price of Complacency—, which documented with technical evidence the decline of our innovative capacity and the economic cost of state inaction on artificial intelligence. The…

Last week I presented a trilogy of analyses —The Silent Retreat of AI in the Dominican Republic, The Retreat Nobody Wants to See, and The Price of Complacency— that documented, with technical evidence, the deterioration of our innovation capacity and the economic cost of state inaction on artificial intelligence.

The diagnosis was clear: between 2020 and 2025, the Dominican Republic fell seven places in the Global Innovation Index (from 90 to 97) and three in the Latin American Artificial Intelligence Index (from sixth to ninth place). This drop was not a methodological fluctuation but the predictable result of strategies without execution, investments without return, and policies without consequences.

According to Tabuga Intelligence data, the country will spend more than US$300 million on imported AI solutions during 2025, while local investment in technological development barely reaches US$10 million. No Dominican universities appear in global rankings, we produce four patents a year, and we keep exporting technical talent to countries that do invest in innovation ecosystems. Worst of all: instead of catalyzing the market, the government competes with it, concentrating resources on its own projects such as CiudadanIA, which exclude MSMEs from the innovation process and perpetuate dependence.

That was the core of the critique: the Dominican Republic does not lack resources but conversion. We invest, but we do not transform; we adopt technology, but we do not produce it. The problem is structural —a dysfunctional ecosystem where talent, capital, and infrastructure do not converge to generate endogenous value.

And right after that assessment, on 9 October, the government announced the Artificial Intelligence Center of Excellence (CEIA) and local production of microprocessors.

The title of this article is no accident; it condenses three dimensions of our relationship with innovation: the aspiration to emulate without building, competition where there should be collaboration, and the confusion between industrialization and technological development. The phonetic similarity to the tech giant everyone wants to imitate is no coincidence.

Envy of the neighbor

In 2021 Chile founded the National Center for Artificial Intelligence (CENIA), a public-private consortium that brings together five universities, technology companies, and the State under a distributed governance model. CENIA publishes research in indexed journals, trains PhDs in machine learning, and collaborates with similar centers in Argentina and Uruguay under the integration framework proposed by ECLAC.

The Dominican Republic, by contrast, announces CEIA: a name that replicates the acronym with one letter of difference, but without the ecosystem that sustains it. There is no mention of university involvement, independent business participation, or regional integration. The initiative seems designed to compete symbolically with Chile, not to collaborate with the region. Where ECLAC proposes south-south bridges, we build walls. We want the prestige of a center of excellence without paying the price of genuine collaboration.

Envy of the giant

The announcement of manufacturing microprocessors in the country reveals an even deeper conceptual confusion. NVIDIA is not a technology leader because it manufactures chips —Taiwan does that for them— but because it designs architectures, develops software (CUDA) and generates intellectual property worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Manufacturing is maquila; design is wealth.

In the 90 Costa Rica and Colombia bet on attracting multinationals with tax incentives. Intel came to Costa Rica; it left no R&D centers, it left assembly plants. Colombia received call centers, not innovation labs. Both countries today have patenting rates lower than those of Chile or Argentina, which prioritized building their own capacities over attracting passive foreign investment.

Manufacturing microprocessors without design capacity is repeating the Costa Rican mistake with more sophisticated technology. It is low-value-added industrialization disguised as technological sovereignty. It does not build a future; it rents out the present.

The reputational gesture

The announcement has symbolic value, and that is not trivial. It signals that the government recognizes AI as a strategic priority and that critical pressure produced an institutional response. In that sense, there is political merit: putting the issue on the public agenda.

Even so, the gesture has the same fragility we have denounced. There is no public budget plan, no technical governance structure, and no measurable impact indicators. It does not specify how CEIA will work with universities, how it will retain talent, or how it will measure its contribution to GDP. It is a reputational move that aims to counter an uncomfortable diagnosis without changing the structure that causes it.

In historical terms, it recalls the old colonial exchange of “mirrors and gold”: a narrative of superficial modernity offered in exchange for symbolic control. The government offers the image of a center of excellence; the private sector and the universities give up prominence in the innovation ecosystem. Everyone gets headlines; no one builds capacity.

What should be done

If the government wanted to generate real impact, three actions would be more effective than a centralized center:

  1. Create a competitive fund of US$50 million for applied AI research, with evaluation by international peers and mandatory participation of local MSMEs. Let universities, companies, and research centers compete for resources on technical merit, not political proximity.
  2. Connect CEIA (if it persists) to the CENIA-Argentina-Uruguay-Peru-Panama ecosystem under shared collaboration. Let the Dominican center be a regional node, not an island. This would imply publication standards, researcher mobility, and impact benchmarking.
  3. Prioritize design over manufacturing. Instead of investing in producing generic chips, fund a university-industry consortium to design specialized architectures (for example, chips for natural language processing in Caribbean Spanish). Let the intellectual property stay in the country. Let Taiwan manufacture, if necessary; we design.

Time is the judge

When the new indexes are published in 2026, we will have the definitive answer. The Global Innovation Index does not reward announcements; it rewards patents, publications, scalable startups and talent retention. The Latin American AI Index does not measure how many centers of excellence we inaugurate, but how many models we train, how many papers we publish and how many AI products we export.

The Dominican Republic wants to be Silicon Valley without having solved Santo Domingo Este. It claims excellence without infrastructure, without retained talent, without scientific output, without intellectual property. And when we compare ourselves with our neighbor, we prefer to copy the name rather than collaborate on the effort.

True excellence is not decreed, announced at press conferences or manufactured in technological maquilas. It is measured in indexed papers, built through regional alliances and sustained by talent that decides to stay because the ecosystem retains it. Neither the CEIA nor the announcement of microprocessor manufacturing has auditable impact indicators or binding regional commitments.

Until there is evidence to the contrary, it will remain the wish to look innovative without paying the cost of being so.