The Mirage of Technological Sovereignty

In recent weeks, the public narrative on Dominican technological development has taken on a triumphalist tone. People speak of a “historic window” and keep repeating terms like “national strategy” as if the country had achieved a structural break with its past. Yet behind the technical language and the international partnerships, there lies a…

In recent weeks, the public narrative on Dominican technological development has taken on a triumphalist tone. People speak of a “historic window” and keep repeating terms like “national strategy” as if the country had achieved a structural break with the past.

Yet behind the technical language and the international alliances lies a phenomenon that should be called by its name: symbolic industrialization. The Dominican Republic produces announcements, not capabilities; it accumulates agreements, not infrastructure; and it celebrates memoranda of understanding as if they were research results. It is a pattern we already know: the substitution of real development with the stagecraft of innovation.

Symbolic industrialization is the process by which a country imitates the forms of an advanced industrial policy without having its technical, institutional or human foundations. The goal is not to produce technology, but to send signals of modernity.

This dynamic shows up predictably in three patterns we have consistently observed in the Dominican context. The first is the emphasis on the signing, not on execution: agreements are announced with global corporations —such as NVIDIA— with no accountability mechanisms, technology transfer or local intellectual property.

The second symptom is the confusion between manufacturing and sovereignty: it is assumed that assembling or packaging microchips amounts to having a semiconductor industry, when those low-value-added stages are, in reality, advanced maquila and not strategic innovation.

The third is the use of geopolitical discourse as technical cover, invoking the “chip war” or “technological sovereignty” to justify policies without metrics, as if naming China or the United States guaranteed endogenous development.

If the National Strategy for the Promotion of the Semiconductor Industry (ENFIS) —about which we have previously written with optimism— aspires to move beyond political theater, it must confront fundamental questions that remain without a public answer:

  • What budget has been allocated in the Public Expenditure Law 2026 to finance infrastructure and the training of specialized talent?
  • How many Dominican engineers have proven experience in microarchitecture or integrated circuit design?
  • At which specific links of the semiconductor chain —from fabless design (fabless) to final packaging— can the Dominican Republic actually compete?
  • What percentage of the intellectual property derived from agreements with foreign companies will be registered in the name of the State or of local institutions?
  • And above all, how will it be ensured that the knowledge generated stays in the country and is not captured by international partners?

Without answers to these questions, the narrative of “technological sovereignty” risks turning into its opposite: a new form of digital dependency, sophisticated and dressed up as global success.

In the 1990s, Latin America fell into the trap of industrial offshoring: attracting factories without intellectual property. Today we are repeating that mistake with semiconductors and artificial intelligence. The regional experience is instructive: while Brazil developed capabilities in embedded software and Chile strengthened its technology services industry, the countries that limited themselves to assembly were left trapped in the structural dependence we are now trying to avoid.

The Dominican Republic could become a digital assembly laboratory where algorithms and chips designed abroad are processed, operated under foreign license and financed with public debt or conditioned investment. This model is attractive in the short term —it generates headlines, jobs and a sense of progress—, but it blocks the creation of endogenous wealth and cognitive sovereignty. The new colonialism is not exercised with cannons, but with proprietary software and confidentiality contracts. I say this from my experience as a member of the Dominican Republic Software Cluster, where we have seen how the best intentions can be distorted without adequate governance frameworks.

A credible technology policy must begin with the principle of intelligent asymmetry: recognizing our structural limitations and designing strategies that turn international cooperation into knowledge transfer, not dependence. To achieve this, the country needs concrete actions. A fund for applied research in artificial intelligence and microelectronics of at least 50 million dollars, allocated on technical merit and reviewed by international peers, is indispensable.

Every project with multinationals should include technological co-authorship clauses and dual patent registration, guaranteeing the creation of local intellectual property. We also need an academic-business Caribbean consortium for the design of specialized chips, prioritizing architectures oriented to natural language processing in Caribbean Spanish and to tropical energy systems.

To this we must add a national system of innovation metrics that measures real results —papers, patents and scalable startups— and not just inputs such as events or inaugurations. Finally, a program to repatriate Dominican talent is essential, with tax incentives that allow our researchers to work from local universities on highly complex design and prototyping projects.

Each Dominican generation has had its own mirage of modernity: free-trade zones in the eighties, tourism in the nineties, ICT in the 2000 and now chips and artificial intelligence. The pattern repeats because we adopt external models without building internal capacity. True technological sovereignty is not decreed with a memorandum or inaugurated with a hub. It is forged with retained talent, replicable knowledge and local intellectual property. As long as we do not measure those variables, we will keep trading digital mirrors for symbolic gold.

As a society, we face a fundamental decision: we can keep collecting announcements and memoranda, or we can take on the more complex but authentic challenge of building real capabilities. Technological independence is designed, trained and patented —instead of depending on decrees or imports. Only when our indicators reflect local intellectual property and retained talent will we be able to say that we have moved beyond the mirage to build genuine digital sovereignty.