When we fell asleep

In quantum mechanics, a system evolves with mathematical precision until something measures it. As long as nobody interacts with it, it exists in superposition: all its possible versions coexist at once. Measurement forces the collapse into a single outcome. The uncomfortable detail is that observing has a cost — every instrument disturbs what it measures, and whoever measures becomes implicated in the system. A century ago, physics discarded the fantasy of the external, neutral observer.

Dominican public policy has just offered a laboratory demonstration. According to the newspaper El Caribe, the new Penal Code, the Ley 74-25, was given a year of vacatio legis precisely so that its flaws could be fixed before it took effect. The president of the Chamber of Deputies, Alfredo Pacheco, admitted that "everybody fell asleep because they thought the date would never arrive", including Congress, Finjus and the country's other institutions. Now Congress is rushing to amend the text in less than two weeks, with the differences concentrated in barely eight or nine articles and the effective date set for August 5.

For twelve months the code existed in superposition. It was approved, published, available for any critical reading. Oversight was formally in the room — foundations, trade associations, academia, Congress itself — but to observe is to interact, and nobody interacted. The deadline worked like the detector that forces the collapse: suddenly all the possible versions of the code had to resolve into one, and within two weeks. Late observation produces violent collapses. What is measured in time is corrected calmly; what is measured against the clock is corrected by shoving.

It is worth distinguishing here between two ways of looking. Oversight (veeduría) observes from a procedural balcony: it draws up minutes, issues reports, follows the protocol of vigilance. Parrhesia — the frank speech of the Greeks that Foucault recovered — observes from inside the power relationship, taking on the personal risk of telling the truth to whoever is in charge. The overseer signs a document; the parrhesiast pays a price. And that difference in cost is exactly the difference between being in the room and measuring the system.

The lawyer José Martínez Brito put it bluntly on the program Esto no es Radio: the one who commits corruption is an expert at it. Translated into the language of the laboratory, that observation is devastating for the formal oversight model. The expert corrupt official calibrates his acts to look impeccable to the auditor's instrument — he operates cleanly on the base that the oversight body decides to measure and concentrates the extraction on the base the protocol ignores. The audit reviews what is auditable; the expert designs what is unauditable. That is why oversight, even when it works perfectly, produces spotless reports on rotten systems.

This is a classic case of the Nash Equilibrium: each participant chooses the strategy that maximizes their gain given what the others do, and none improves by changing their decision alone. That equilibrium can be terrible for everyone, and still nobody moves.

Parrhesia breaks that equilibrium because it changes the basis of measurement. Whoever speaks from inside knows the table, recognizes the plays, knows where to look because they have seen how the pot is shared out. Their denunciation is unpredictable for the expert: it arrives through channels the protocol never contemplated. And game theory completes the argument. When there are actors at the table who watch over the outcome — at real risk, with a frank voice — those who collude in the gain are forced to leave some margin. The mere presence of the parrhesiast changes the payoffs of the game: extracting everything becomes dangerous, and that forced margin is what allows the rest to grow and prosper. Observation with a cost redistributes, even when it never catches the expert red-handed.

Two recent Dominican scenes display the equilibrium with textbook precision.

The first stems from the Ley 30-26, enacted on June 18, which redrew the tax treatment of software. The design rewards with zero withholding acquisitions that transfer intellectual property — an almost mythological arrangement in the technology trade, because no global vendor sells its rights — and it applies a 15% withholding on the gross value of licenses and subscriptions contracted abroad, which are practically all of corporate technology spending. The design looks impeccable on paper and collapses at the game table. Each player's optimal response is predictable: nobody migrates to the rewarded category because the market lacks sellers willing to hand over their property, and everyone keeps renting from abroad with the extra cost built into the price.

The result is the postulate in action: an incentive nobody takes and a penalty everybody pays, because the digital input becomes more expensive and our competitiveness against the region and the world absorbs the blow. A mechanism designed without market observers is a decision taken in superposition: the collapse will come, and it will come against the clock of competitiveness.

The second scene hurts more because it portrays an archetype: the businessman who abandoned market practices because the State's procurement and delivery mechanisms turned out to be more profitable for him. Without a digital maturity registry, what he delivers is whatever was served — even if the institution ends up storing the products of the tender in a warehouse in some province. Serving the private sector, overregulated both locally and internationally, demands an effort and an investment that the earlier practice already discouraged. And when external forces squeeze the country, the adjustment plans fall on the regulated — who do not even attend the discussion forums, which ties in with the complaint of the president of the Chamber of Deputies. These actors apply the postulate with discipline: if participating requires effort and resources, the rational move is silence. They occupy the seats of oversight without saying anything.

The figures in the T al Cubo® report, Perspectivas de la Digitalización República Dominicana 2025, put a number on the equilibrium. Of the public ICT spending of 2025 — RD$2,784 million spread across 179 vendors — the top 12 companies concentrate RD$2,055 million: 73.8% of the total. The top 5 alone already captures half the money (50.1%) and the top 20 reaches 82.9%. Put in proportion, 6.7% of vendors take three out of every four pesos, while 167 companies compete for the remaining margin — the margin that those colluding in the gain leave so the rest can survive, just as the game predicts. And within the top group, two firms add up to almost a third of the total, both leveraged on proprietary licensing by exclusivity: the structural engine of the concentration. Exclusivity is, precisely, the base that oversight ignores — the file meets every requirement of the protocol, the pattern stays invisible to the auditor and is revealed only when someone measures where the procedure decided not to look. A third of public technology spending flows, year after year, toward proprietary licenses shielded by exclusivity.

Silence is also an equilibrium strategy.

That is why parrhesia is necessary. The parrhesiast is the player who deviates knowing it will cost them — irrational in Nash's terms, indispensable in a country's terms. Their mere existence changes everyone else's payoffs: the designer of the mechanism knows someone will measure his rules before the collapse, and the businessman of silence knows someone will name the warehouse where the tenders sleep. Breaking a bad equilibrium requires exactly that — someone willing to pay the price of moving first.

The lesson of the Penal Code is a sample of what happens in our environment when actions exceed the legislative. Every public decision that passes without implicated observers is left to chance — to the randomness of the interests that were in fact measuring in silence. Institutionalizing oversight is a necessary condition, but cultivating parrhesia is the sufficient one. A country needs fewer balconies and more people willing to pay the price of looking closely. Because in politics, as in physics, what nobody measures ends up deciding itself. And almost never in favor of those who were asleep.